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This paper analyses the meaning of ‘local ownership in aid projects’, the 
current vogue in aid practice for improving project results. Aid involves intercultural 
relations and aspects of inequality between organizations and individuals.
1 The 
discussion focuses on the common triangular arrangement of a foreign donor, an 
international consultant, and the receiving local organization. Three main lines of 
inquiry are pursued: firstly into the fundamental understanding of individual concepts 
of cognitive and emotional facilities involved in inter-cultural understanding and 
exchanges; secondly into the possibility to translate concepts appropriate to individual 
human beings into useful organizational concepts; and thirdly into the relation 
between individuals and organizations.
2 The outcome of the paper is a critical 
reflection on different perspectives on local ownership and a comparison between 
them in terms of complementarities and conflicts. 
The concept of ownership of a project by an organization can be loosely 
understood as to capture the degree of responsibility that the organization has and 
shows for bringing the project to a successful end and for sustaining the project 
results. Apart from being a key factor in achieving project success, local ownership in 
aid projects is also considered as an end in itself. Lengkeek (2004) argues that this 
intrinsic value of ownership can also be a guiding principle for organizational change. 
Given that in a private market context, ownership by organizations of their 
projects is less problematic, donor organizations try to stimulate local ownership of 
aid projects by creating a quasi-market conditions vis-à-vis the supply of services 
transferred in the aid project, coupled with a hands-off approach at the donor side. 
The donor becomes the ‘financier’ so to speak and the local organization is assumed 
to be fully in charge of the (mostly foreign) consultant. The quasi-market situation for 
the local organization is further ensured, one hopes, by insisting on cost-sharing 
between aid provider and receiver as an indication of the local organization’s 
willingness to pay for the project and having the local organization in charge of the 
various project phases and elements including tendering, contracting and contract 
                                                 
1This paper has greatly benefited from the interaction with Rayomond Apthorpe and João Guimarães 
during our joint work on ownership in aid projects (see Guimarães, J, R. Apthorpe, and P. de Valk 
2002). I am also grateful to Kristin Komives, George Lengkeek and an anonymous referee for their 
helpful comments. 
2While elements of this approach can be useful for other applications in the field of organizational 
behaviour, this paper will limit itself to the issue of ownership in aid projects. 
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monitoring in relation with the consultant. The market conditions remain quasi-market 
conditions in so far as the aid provider does more than a regular bank would do in 
relation to the local organization and the consultant. After all, aid is not a private 
market situation in that sense and retains its soft edges. Moreover, given the 
prevailing inequalities in the aid context, the real transfer of power and ownership is 
never fully achieved. After all, the hands-off approach remains a voluntary restraint. 
Whereas the above statements have a great deal of intuitive appeal, further 
analysis below will reveal the complexities involved in concepts, contexts, and 
perceptions. Complexities in concepts partly arise from applying human concepts to 
organizations, but also from using singular concepts for multifaceted entities as in the 
case of projects and aid. Complexities in contexts arise from the aid context itself 
including its inequalities in terms of resources, the sometimes ambivalent objectives 
surrounding aid projects, and from the cultural differences prevailing between the 
parties (not partners per se) involved in aid projects. Complexities in perceptions 
derive from different values systems, individually maintained or institutionalised. 
Ethical positions are taken and not taken, pragmatic instruments prescribed, and 
cynical analysis applied judging the ethical position as paternalistic and the pragmatic 
view as naïve. Receivers of aid may view aid as (combinations of) unavoidable 
dependency, cost minimizing solutions, free resources, quid pro quo, entitlements or 
justified claims, and genuine aid. Is there a compromise position, pragmatic, not 
naive, not paternalistic, yet ethical and reciprocal? 
After this introductory section, the paper will start in Section 2 with discussing 
the conceptualization of organizational behaviour using individualistic human 
concepts (humanoids). This is followed by Section 3 on projects and organizations, 
including organizational learning and interactions between organizations. The 
common form of a local organization, consultant and donor will be the main point of 
reference. Section 4 reviews details of the concept of ownership and discusses the 
possibility of multiple ownership. This will prepare for the discussion in Section 5 on 
perspectives on aid and local ownership of aid projects. Four perspectives will be 
analysed and compared: the ethical perspective; the bureaucratic perspective; the 
incentives perspective and the rational expectation perspective. Different types of 
organizations will be briefly discussed in relation to ownership. Finally, the 
concluding section will discuss the implications for aid in practice. 
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The overall conclusion of this paper is that, given the right conditions, good 
practice is possible and people are influenced by general ethical principles. When 
selecting projects with competent local organizations in their field of priorities, 
ownership can be facilitated by the appropriate aid modalities, just as ownership can 
be obstructed by misplaced aid efforts. In other words, ownership is already there, to 
be selected. Trying to encourage ownership where it does not exist, turns out to be a 
self-contradicting exercise. 
The author’s position is that, to be effective, aid should be practiced as an 
ethical relation, including elements of planning, pragmatic considerations and 
commitment. The organizational form of the aid agency and the consultant should 
emphasize higher order learning processes found in more innovative organizations 
rather than relying in routine management typical for bureaucracies. Interactions 
between professionals in the role of consultants and professionals in local 
organizations tend to be more easily focussed on commitment to quality of transfer of 
knowledge and skills. Projects relating to core priorities of the local organization are 
more likely to select existing ownership than projects lower on the priority list. The 
emphasis on commitment and limitation of project choice to areas of competence of 
aid provider, consultant and local organization requires honesty about motivation and 
the limitation of one’s competences. In this sense, project planning constitutes an art 
rather than a technique. 
 
 
2  INDIVIDUAL CONCEPTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL METAPHORS 
This paper is about ownership of a project by an organization. Ownership by 
an organization normally implies a legal relationship between the organization as a 
legal body and other legal entities. Used in this way, it has precise meaning described 
in the legal terms. Here the use of this concept is quite different and refers to human 
emotions and feelings of responsibility and commitment. In literature, these concepts 
are used for organizations as ‘humanoids’ (anthropomorphic language) without 
providing adequate definitions at the level of organizations. Yet, the typical human 
experience of psychological emotions and inter-subjectivity involved in these 
concepts cannot be reciprocated for organizations. 
Two complementary approaches can be followed to try and understand these 
and other anthropomorphic concepts at the level of organizations, in this paper called 
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the ‘aggregation-reduction approach’ and ‘behaviouralist approach’. The 
‘aggregation-reduction approach’ looks at organizations as collection of individuals 
and therefore reduces organizational concepts to a multitude of individual human 
concepts. Possible interactions between individuals in the organizational environment 
may lead to changes in their feelings, emotions and understanding. Yet these concepts 
remain essentially human, albeit influenced by the organizational context. 
The ‘behaviouralist’ approach translates these human concepts to 
organizational concepts. By analysing what these concepts mean in terms of actions at 
the level of the individual (forsaking, for the time being, their emotional and 
psychological content), and then to investigate if it is possible to identify similar 
activities for organizations. Thus, the meaningful similarity is compared with regard 
to actions and activities, not emotions and feelings. Using human concepts for 
organizations in this meaningful way boils down to using them as metaphors. 
Organizations behave as if they are committed, as if they feel ownership and so on. 
The metaphors become useful shorthand for a certain set of activities that bears 
resemblance to activities undertaken by individuals characterised by those words.
3
For example, the ‘memory’ of an organization can be understood as the physi-
cal storage place of information (computers, files, etc.) coupled with organizational 
practice (organizational ‘scripts’ or ‘routines’, as they are called in organizational 
learning theories) that guide employees to store potentially useful information, re-
trieve relevant information, and bring it under the attention of departments that can 
utilize the information for their departmental objectives.
4
This seems to be an adequate picture of an organizational memory. Yet, the 
typical human emotions that come with remembering are absent in the organizational 
metaphor, useful as it may be to indicate something similar to individual remembering 
                                                 
3Using metaphors can be both creative and dangerous. The creativity consists in recognizing the 
resemblance of an existing concept in one context in another context and discovering the potential of 
the transfer of meaning in the new context. The relational use of a word (i.e. its meaning) stimulates 
finding unexpected relations (the loose ends, so to speak) in the new context. The danger consists in 
uncritically accepting all possible relations of the original concept in its new context. 
4Thus, the last step of organizational remembering is taken when the information is put in the inbox of 
the relevant manager. The manager then employs his/her human facilities to put the information in a 
context and to provide meaning for the organization. Remembering in an organization is purposeful. 
Remembering for individuals can not only be purposeful but also by association. Unlike in 
organizations, it is related to positive and negative passion, when the richness of the full experience is 
recreated. This does not happen in organizations, although it is tempting to look for relevant metaphors 
also here. 
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at the organizational level. However, this last step is an essential human step and must 
be done by individuals, although organizations can create conducive environments for 
this to happen. The importance of this last step will be discussed when focussing on 
the aid sector emphasizing aid as a job (section 0). 
The implications of this ‘metaphorical’ interpretation of the concept of 
ownership in aid projects will be further developed later on (section 0). For now, the 
concept of corporate culture can be used to provide the link between the 
behaviouralist and the aggregation-reduction approach. Nooteboom (2000) argues that 
an important role of the entrepreneur/manager in organizations is to provide for 
motivational coordination, creating a corporate culture that focuses interest and values 
of its employees for maximum cooperation in interaction, within the framework of the 
firms own objectives and competitive competences.
5 This view links up with the work 
of Simon (1991) where identification with the organization through corporate culture 
is argued to be of crucial importance for the purpose of coordination. Corporate 
culture links the individual with the organization (the micro with the meso) in practice 
(and in theory). A wider concept of corporate identity can be used to explain 
organizational behaviour as a corollary to the individual psyche. This would consist of 
the organization’s mission, competences, structure and culture. However, the details 
of and interactions between these elements are no longer comparable in a 




3  PROJECTS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
Aid projects are plagued by problems. Gow and Morss (1988) provide a good 
and still relevant overview. One of the problems identified is the incidence of donor-
driven projects, the concern of this paper. For the present purpose, i.e. analysing 
‘ownership in aid projects by organizations’ the discussion in this section is a bit more 
dry and abstract and will focus on breaking down the project concept into parts, each 
                                                 
5Indeed for Nooteboom (2000) this is the most crucial task for the entrepreneur and gives a more 
fundamental and dynamic explanation why firms exist than the more static explanation of transaction 
cost theory. In this view then, the firm is seen as primarily and fundamentally a motivational focussing 
device. This paper is on organizations in general which do not necessarily operate in the market and 
therefore may have different raisons d’etre. The motivational device however seems crucial also for 
ensuring good organizational performance in general. 
6Yet, this would be an interesting assignment and would combine inputs from different theories of the 
organization and the firm. 
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of which will give rise to different ownership questions. Further, this section discusses 
organizational aspects of learning and an organizational typology that can be used to 
reflect differences in learning practices. This in turn can be related to the possible 
interaction of organizations with respect to ownership of project elements. 
Most aid project will go through various stages during their planning phase 
(formulating the initial project idea, developing a preliminary proposal, organizing 
finance, developing a detailed proposal, approval, tendering for suppliers and 
consultants, selection of suppliers and consultants) and their implementation phase 
(organizing inputs, staff training, activities to produce project output, monitoring, 
transfer, evaluation). The order can be different particularly in the implementation 
phase where some of the stages are simultaneous. In connection with ownership, a 
useful distinction can be made between project processes/activities (over various 
phases in the project cycle), material project inputs/outputs, immaterial project 
inputs/outputs, and project objectives. 
For each of these stages, the ownership question can be asked. Who is the 
owner: the consultant, the aid provider, or the local organization? Which processes are 
important and what kind of organizational activities correspond to these forms of 
ownership? What effect does a particular constellation of ownership of one stage have 
on ownership in subsequent stages? With knowledge as project output, what are the 
learning processes in the aid receiving organization? Section 0 will elaborate on this 
in more detail. 
In cross-cultural aid settings, organizations must learn. Organizational learning 
can be described as the change in organizational scripts or routines (ways of doing 
things). First order learning entails greater efficiency of substitution of information 
into scripts. Second order learning entails changes in first order script architecture, in 
processes of exploration (the organizational processes that govern this behaviour are 
called second order routines).
7 A third level of learning would be the level of meta-
learning: learning how to learn. The relatively recent field of knowledge management 
focuses on the latter as an explicit strategy available to organizations (Sanchez 2001). 
Still within the present focus, organizational learning occurs between 
organizations as well as within organizations. Holmqvist (2003) describes the 
                                                 
7This loosely corresponds with the notions of single and double loop learning developed by Argyris and 
Schön (1978). 
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interaction between two organizations in terms of two-way processes: internalization 
from the joint level to the intra-organizational level and externalization from the intra-
organizational level to the joint level. The type of learning in the interaction and these 
processes can be described by exploration (innovating new products) or exploitation 
(applying new insights to consumer production). Similar processes can be identified 
between individuals in cognitive and emotional processes. Psychologists analyse the 
development of cognition (Shanon 1993) as a process of scaffolding within the 
parent-child relation (in particular, mother-child) in early development of children.
8 
Psychoanalysts (Benjamin 1993) describe the development of emotional facilities also 
in terms of the mother-child relation where the recognition and appreciation of 
another subject outside the self (intersubjectivity) grows through the continued love 
and attention of the mother towards the child. Both processes, cognitive and 
emotional, require sustained activity and feeling from the mother (or the parent).
9
Within the context of aid projects both cognitive and emotional processes are 
important in the interaction between individuals (intersubjectivity across individual 
cultures and knowledge differences) and the interaction between organizations (inter-
action across organizational cultures and knowledge differences). Generally speaking, 
without attempting possible nuances, national culture influences both individual and 
organizational culture, whereas individual culture (in organizations) is shaped by na-
tional culture as well as organizational culture. 
Specific organizational stereotypes such as the standard production 
organization, bureaucracy, professional and innovative organization (as described by 
Mintzberg 1979) are characterized by different coordination mechanisms, 
respectively: direct supervision and control, standardization of procedures and 
outputs, standardization of professional skills and norms, mutual adjustment of ad-hoc 
teams. Real life organizations may reflect different combinations of these stereotypes. 
In the order presented these stereotypes also reflect increasing reliance on higher 
order learning processes and routines and would behave differently towards projects 
                                                 
8New concepts without their full meaning are upheld by the mother until more new concepts provide 
for the full meaning of these words and concepts jointly in their relational context. 
9While these observations are not made by a professional psychoanalyst, and therefore may have 
several flaws and be in need of refinement, they show that there is sufficient scope for analysing the 
range of aid relationships in psychoanalytical terms, both at the level of individuals and, collectively, of 
shared views or perspectives, as well as metaphorically at the level of organizations. 
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with other organizations in cross-cultural settings. As argued before, the nature of aid 
projects is special in the sense that aid projects are undertaken in a cross-cultural 
setting and unequal conditions. Specific demands will be placed on the ‘attitudes’ of 
participating organizations.
10 The type of organization most capable of cross-cultural 
adaptation and inter-action (intersubjectivity) would have to be flexible, responding to 
challenges of its environment. This would be the innovative organization, whereas the 
bureaucracy will be its negative counterpart. This applies equally to the aid provider 
and the consultant organization. Aid agencies, being also in aid administration have a 
tendency towards bureaucratic organizations with that might lose out on the 
commitment required for the innovative cross-cultural inter-activity. Consultants, in 
so far as they are professional organizations, have an advantage when the local 
organization is also a professional organization. The common standards, values and 
language of the profession can counterbalance the cross-cultural differences. Also, the 
local organization must be a learning organization, at least in so far as the project is 
concerned, given that the project purpose is transfer of knowledge. 
With new projects, involving the first time interaction between consultant and 
local organization, the balance of initial ownership is often on the side of the 
consultant. The local organization grows but is guided by the consultant. This learning 
process has been called ‘scaffolding’ as initially the new elements do not all fit 
together to support each other. When the local organization grows stronger, its 
initiative in and ownership of processes will increase. The balance of power between 
the consultant and the local organization is put to the test. With the technical 
knowledge transfer reaching its completion, the local organization will be more in 
control of its own project and engage in a new project on a more equal footing, 
expressing stronger ownership with the ability to interact creatively with consultants, 
also at the initial stages.
11 Inequality in aid projects, also embedded in the notion 
transfer of knowledge, implies that the local organization absorbs most of the change 
and is therefore in that sense most inter-active. 
                                                 
10Habermas (1981) distinguishes between communicative action and purposeful action to describe 
differences in individual behaviour. Communicative action requires a learning attitude and flexibility to 
change in the discovery of other perspectives. Hofstede (1980) notes power-distance and 
individualism/collectivism as relevant inter-cultural dimensions. The usefulness of these and other 
general concepts depends much on their detailed and differentiated understanding in concrete cases. 
11These could be interpreted as psychoanalytical metaphors at the level of organizations in terms of 
awareness of the other, objectivation of the other, and finally subjectivation of the other. 
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Transfer of learning routines will first occur at the tacit and individual level: 
interactions between professionals with much implicit learning but little explicit 
learning coupled with explicit learning in training sessions without organizational 
storage. At a later stage, second order routines for learning may develop, with training 
departments, a training programme/policy, training and work manuals and explicit 
quality standards. Third order routines would imply that the local organization 
engages in knowledge management and routines on learning how to learn. 
Thus, within the organization there are individual learning processes through 
interactions between individuals (intersubjectivity and tacit learning) and through 
exposure to more explicit organizational knowledge. The organization learns through 
learning individuals and through adjusting its routines at various levels. Between 
organizations involved in aid projects, joint action (inter-activity rather than inter-
subjectivity) implies processes of internalization and externalization, differentiated 
across the participants according to their roles. 
 
 
4  OWNERSHIP: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES 
This section argues that firstly ownership by organizations is a metaphor 
derived from the intuitive understanding of ownership relating to individual 
ownership. Secondly, this metaphor will obtain different meanings for different 
elements and aspects of projects. Thirdly, the possibilities for multiple ownership and 
co-ownership are discussed and their meaning critically examined.
12
Ownership is best understood at the level of an individual. Translating this 
concept into its metaphorical use at the organizational level implies defining 
organizational activities that are similar to those of individuals when practicing 
ownership. These involve activities directed at control of outcomes towards 
organizational objectives, monitoring and feedback activities (and systems) to enable 
the organization to evaluate the implementation of the project, and systematic efforts 
to absorb the project output. In the case of knowledge, this project output can be 
absorbed by tacit and explicit learning processes.
13
                                                 
12For a more detailed analysis of ‘ownernship’ see Guimarães, Apthorpe, and Valk (2002). 
13In brief, the term tacit knowledge refers to forms of knowledge that can only be transferred by close 
interaction between the owner of tacit knowledge and the potential receiver when performing the 
function for which the knowledge is required (Polanyi 1962). 
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Ownership of (elements of) projects can be experienced by individuals and can 
be defined to exist for organizations as well. In addition, ownership can be shared 
between individuals and between organizations. Multiple ownership normally implies 
a distribution mechanisms defining who owns which parts of the object owned or 
what percentage of the fruits of the object (or asset, in this sense). 
Yet, there is also the possibility of multiple ownership becoming co-
ownership, particularly in the case of objectives. Co-ownership here means that the 
full value of ownership by one party can be enjoyed without diluting it for others. 
Moreover, there is also the possibility that ownership (of output) by one party (the 
local organization) gives rise to increase in satisfaction for other parties (consultant 
and aid provider). Both cases of co-ownership will be realized when achieving project 
success with respect to these objectives is important in their wider incentive 
framework of aid provider and consultant. This will normally be the case with the 
officially declared project objectives and related output (possibly including the 
objective of ownership as a value in itself). 
Thus, co-ownership (when it exists) exhibits the characteristics of a public 
good defined over the three parties. In economics, a particular consumable good is a 
public good when enjoying a piece of a public good by one consumer does not reduce 
the availability to other consumers (in-exhaustibility) and it is impossible to exclude 
individuals from consuming it (non- excludability). An example might be ‘national 
safety’ provided by government. In a similar way, a private good is defined when only 
the direct consumer derives satisfaction (utility) from consuming the good and that the 
consumption of one unit reduces the total availability of the private good exactly by 
that one unit.
14
Utility (i.e. satisfaction), in economics is defined as a concept applying to 
individuals. Even a social welfare function derives total utility of the society from 
aggregating individual welfares (although not without conceptual problems). To 
define utility for organizations it must be defined in relation to the fulfilment of 
organizational objectives. All events and achievements that contribute to reaching the 
organization’s objectives will have a positive impact on the organization’s utility.
15
                                                 
14Mixed goods are somewhere in between these extremes. 
15In that sense it differs from a national utility function which is assumed to be derived from 
aggregating individual utilities. 
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These economic definitions are challenging when applied to the good 
‘ownership of project elements’. As argued above, the degree to which ownership can 
be shared varies between project elements. Therefore, the question as to what type of 
a ‘good’ ownership is, must necessarily be broken down into its components/aspect of 
ownership as discussed at the beginning of this section. Without discussing all 
components and aspects, some examples in addition to the ones above might be 
illustrative. 
Ownership of management of implementation processes may serve as a first 
example of the complexities involved. Whereas a distribution of management tasks 
between consultant and local organization might be useful, unclarities in and 
disagreements about management responsibilities may lead to conflicts between them 
over management control. Thus where both parties attempt to manage the same thing 
at the same time there is an ‘exclusion struggle’ over management responsibilities and 
areas. This implies that good management is perceived to involve excludability. Yet, 
when actual management practice is an arena of disagreement, its solution (under 
disagreement) will affect the utility of each parties whatever outcome there will be. 
Ownership of management processes is thus neither a public nor a private good and 
cannot easily be categorized within this framework. That in itself is revealing. 
Ownership of the knowledge output is a different matter again. First of all, 
knowledge in the abstract is not a pure public good since it is not accessible to all 
when its complexity requires training and prior knowledge. Yet appropriating 
knowledge does not reduce the total amount of abstract knowledge. In the relation 
between consultant and local organization, the consultant is the initial owner, both in 
the sense of being the source of abstract knowledge as well as having appropriated the 
knowledge within its organization. Transferring the knowledge neither deducts from 
the knowledge of the consultant, nor, for that matter, from the abstract knowledge 
pool. The new owners of the knowledge have exclusive control over their own 
appropriated knowledge. In its turn, this very fact may lead to increase in utility for 
the aid provider and the consultant (which of course is different from the utility of the 
knowledge itself). 
Moving beyond ownership to concepts like partnerships, commitment, inter-
activity and intersubjectivity the limitations of the individualistic definition of public 
and private goods and their linkage to utility becomes apparent. Goods such as these 
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are jointly produced and jointly consumed. They do not even exist separately for 
single consumers. 
Thus these economic concepts have sharpened the discussion but they do not 
seem to be adequate to capture the full picture.
16 Ownership in some cases (e.g. 
objectives) can be shared ownership, or co-ownership; in other cases (e.g. 
management of implementation by the consultant) ownership is more exclusive, 
although this may not necessarily infringe on the possibility of local ownership at later 
stages or project outputs. Ownership when challenged in cases of exclusivity will lead 
to conflict, but again, the effects of conflict are not always detrimental to project 
success, ownership of the final output, and ownership of market institutions 
(managing the consultant) in later projects. 
 
 
5  PERCEPTIONS ON AID AND LOCAL OWNERSHIP 
Having laid the conceptual groundwork for analysing local ownership in aid 
projects, the discussion can now turn to complexities that arise from different 
perspectives on aid in relation to local ownership.
17 These are the ethical perspective, 




5.1  The ethical perspective: aid as commitment 
The first complexity arising from perspectives is discussed under the heading 
‘ethical paradox’. Given the prevailing inequalities between the various parties 
involved in aid projects, the ethical principles of human equality and self 
determination become problematic. Many aid workers and organizations will be 
motivated by these principles. Yet, in the aid relationship they are the ones with the 
resources, powers and opportunities. Without this aid transfers would not be feasible. 
                                                 
16The argument that the economic concepts have been applied outside their intended field of 
application does not hold since, clearly, the items discussed all yield utility for the parties involved, 
certainly when only reduced to their composing individuals. 
17Other perspectives and labels are possible: for example, the ‘pragmatic perspective’ emphasizing 
ownership as instrument (coming close to the incentives perspective) and the ‘cynical perspective’ 
viewing the ethical perspective in particular as paternalistic, the pragmatic/incentives view as naïve, 
and leaning perhaps towards the ‘aid as trade perspective’. 
18See Carr, McAuliffe and MacLachlan (1998) for a detailed discussion of psychological aspects of aid, 
including the impact of inequalities in aid and the views of those receiving aid. 
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Thus, the aid relationship itself, in its essence, is an expression of inequality, in 
contradiction with its ethical motivations. Of course the ethical intentions are to do 
something about that, but in the actual practice of doing, the glaring inequalities 
coupled with all the problems in achieving success cast doubts on the possibilities to 
achieve these ethical objectives and, in the end, on the ethical purity of the 
intervention itself. 
The (psychological/theoretical) ethical answer lays in formulating partnership 
and local ownership as starting points of engaging in aid relationships. But not only 
do intentions differ from practice, self-reflecting individuals can also engage in 
critical analysis of their own motivations. In this way, a struggle can develop between 
intentions at one psychological level and cognition, leading to doubt at another level. 
Thus, notions such as partnership and local ownership become problematic even with 
their ethical proponents. With cultural differences between donors and receivers, these 
problems will only increase as the vast literature on hermeneutics testifies. Some 
understand these processes as double hermeneutics: interpreting others who are also 
interpreting themselves.
19 But also the latter interpret the former: a two way double 
hermeneutic process. 
Yet, despite the adverse conditions of ambiguous, multi-level objectives of aid 
and unequal power relations between the providers and receivers of aid, intentions to 
enhance local ownership can be genuine expressions of commitment at individual as 
well as organizational level, commitment based on (partial) identification and (partial) 
understanding of receivers of aid: inter-subjective and intercultural awareness. 
Theories within feminist psychoanalysis, analyzing the developing relations between 
mother and child, establish for the creation of the human facility of inter-subjectivity 
in moments of joint recognition of the other.
20 Inter-subjectivity embedded in 
commitment at the individual level gives rise to trans-subjective border zones of 
(temporary and partial)  recognition.  Thus,  at  best,  the possibility of commitment to 
                                                 
19Hermeneutics can be understood as the art of transfer of meanings between different interpretive 
systems. Self-reflecting individuals transfer meaning between their immediate interpretive system and 
their conscious, rational interpretive system. The term ‘double hermeneutics’ was used by Rene 
Devisch at a seminar at the African Study Centre , in Leiden on March 23, 2004. 
20See Jessica Benjamin (1993). Where inter-subjectivity is a creative act vindicating objectivation and 
aggression, for some, also in the world of aid, the ongoing psychological struggle for meaning and 
sense is directed at aid receivers as objects, temporarily fulfilling the psychological need of meaning. 
Disappointments in terms of lack of reciprocity may lead back via disillusion into aggression.
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ownership and partnership does exist as a joint experience between providers and 
receivers of aid but is never complete and full-time sustained. This experience may 
continue to act for a while as individual motivation for continued commitment. At 
worst, real life pragmatic demands, realities of aid and non-aid practice, diverging 
cultures and part-time interaction cooperate to overshadow commitment in the search 
for partnership and local ownership. 
Wanting the other to become a subject (partner/owner) in the aid relationship 
can be interpreted as a desire to enter into a subject-subject relationship where the aid 
relationship (perceived as unequal) has made it into a subject-object relationship. 
Why? Is it guilt? Is it an adult facility for recognition under the safe condition of 
being the one with power? Like a parent over a child, without the need to fully 
compromise the absolute self, thereby solving the paradox that consist of the conflict 
between the asserting the self and the need for others to obtain recognition? Yet 
precisely this desire for local ownership and partnership, when imposed and 
conditioned, is an expression of the subject-object relationship. Enjoying the fun of 
cross-cultural recognition may be a luxury that the aid receiver does not aspire for. 
Thus, at the receiving end, local organizations and their employees find 
themselves doing their work in an increasingly global and competitive environment, 
yet lacking competitive strength, know how and physical  resources to reach levels of 
efficiency and competence prevailing in richer countries. Also receiving aid involves 
an ethical paradox: how to accept aid without losing dignity? Aid brings benefits to 
the organization and its employees. Yet, for an individual, receiving aid does not feel 
good because of the dependent position it creates. People prefer resources at their 
command. Employees in aid receiving organizations are just doing their work and do 
not necessarily feel obliged. Recourse can be taken to viewing aid as a right, an 
entitlement, for the sake of social justice. Alternatively, aid can be viewed as an 
exchange of resources for influence or even moral satisfaction: ‘aid as trade’ (rather 
than ‘aid or trade’), as elaborated upon in section 0. But aid taken for granted can 
upset the donor, despite ownership rhetoric (as also hinted at in footnote 20). Clashes 
between reality of aid and perspectives may occur for example when aid provided 
with strings attached leads to mistrust and hatred despite or perhaps because a more 
ethical perspective of aid is maintained and assumed for the other party as well. 
Good aid practice tries to manoeuvre around these roadblocks. Tackling them, 
incorporating or adjusting to them, sometimes only recognizing them. Planning and 
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management practices are adopted, for better or worse, using logical frameworks, 
sector-wide approaches, donor coordination, and other technical tools. From a more 




5.2  The bureaucratic perspective: aid as job 
More complexities in perspectives arise under the label of ‘the aid complex’. 
Taken together, a great variety of motivations, activities, organizations and 
individuals constitute the ‘aid complex’. The argument is that firstly aid has become 
institutionalized, professionalized and bureaucratized. Secondly and partly caused by 
this, aid creates dependencies not only by supporting and sustaining institutions and 
bureaucracies but also by interfering with the solutions that aid is supposed to solve, 
sometimes aggravating the problem. Thirdly, related to the ‘ethical paradox’ the 
question can be posed whether aiding people in need is an ethical achievement or 
whether aid-givers are just doing their normal duty? Is it an ethical right of those in 
need and can they demand assistance? This would meet no objection when 
conditioned by “on ethical grounds”. Yet when put in practice the strength of this 
perception evaporates. Professionalization may easily lead to bureaucratization; 
commitment replaced by competence and competence by complacency. 
With institutionalization of aid meanings of important concepts transform into 
their bureaucratic equivalents. Words such as partnership, ownership, commitment, 
compassion and friendship are inadequate labels only partially indicating and thereby 
revoking a feeling or an experience. Philosophers and social scientist analyze and 
refine these concepts breaking them down into their core meaning and its possible 
variations, their practical use, and the behavioural aspects related to these concepts. 
So far no harm is done. Harm is done when these concepts are developed and taken 
over by planners and managers and become tools for development interventions. 
Their original relation to feelings and experiences are now replaced by instrumental 
and logical calculations arguing from cause to effect. These concepts are now 
captured by guidelines and procedures, checklists and matrices. Partnership matrices 
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already exist.
21 Within the world of project aid and its planning these words now 
recreate themselves into new but surrogate behaviour: as-if partners, as-if 
commitment, as-if ownership. Thus the removal of meaning and its subsequent 
transformation takes place in four steps: (1) from feeling or experience to meaningful 
(still evoking original feelings experience) words, (2) from meaningful words to 
logical (intellectually correct) words, (3) from logical words to instrumental 
concepts), (4) from instrumental concepts to surrogate behaviour.
22 This surrogate 
behaviour is real enough with regard to the dynamics in a bureaucratic environment, 
yet surrogate when related to original meanings. 
These steps do not necessarily lead to their potential logical consequence of 
surrogate behaviour. Commitment will infuse the instrumental concepts with the right 
content so that step four would consist of passionate behaviour guided by logical in-
struments. Instruments now make sense, are complemented and adjusted when they 
do not lead to desired results. Genuine partnerships can be established, not through 
partnership matrices, but through personal integrity, friendship and commitment. 
On the side of local organizations, responses may develop that sustain the 
surrogate behaviour. The concerns that local organizations are not the drivers of 
‘their’ projects, yet are supposed to be the main agent for sustaining the project results 
are largely voiced by the aid giving organizations. From the view of local 
organizations another view on the same issue could be imagined with expectations 
and behaviour shaped by economic inequalities, colonial history and current practices 
of arrogance within the context of racial and cultural differences. Aid becomes one of 
the facts of life to be used for one’s own advantage. The practice of aid management 
becomes one of donor management, e.g. how to manage the donor. Ownership and 
partnership obtain instrumental rather than fundamental value. The elements of the aid 
transfer considered useful are taken on board pursued and sustained, while fulfilling 
only the necessary conditions determined by the donor. If the donor wants ownership, 
the rituals will be initiated and played out without, however, the ‘true’ commitment 
for  and  ownership of the  donor’s  objectives. There is of  course  always  ownership, 
                                                 
21Surely, commitment and friendship matrices must be already on the drawing board. 
22Surrogate behaviour in the context of actual problem solving by civil servants is a well described 
phenomenon, although without dubbing the term as such (Schaeffer 1984, Valk 1986). 
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almost by definition, by local organizations and individuals, but naturally only for 
own objectives. 
In this manner, aid recipients may arrive through a different route at the same 
surrogate behaviour as planners and managers, thereby creating a stable mutually 
reinforcing situation of sustainable surrogate behaviour. The difference however is 
that this occurs in an unequal situation. For the recipient, the surrogate behaviour is a 
rational response to the idiosyncraticies of the donor community, even when a true 
commitment to solve their own problems exists. Merely adopting the language and go 
through the rituals of ownership, partnership, empowerment and the like will assist in 
obtaining funds and other assistance to pursue their own objectives. 
This rational surrogate behaviour must be distinguished from ‘genuine’ 
bureaucratic surrogate behaviour when also recipient organizations become 
‘professionalized’ just as the planners and managers in donor organizations and arrive 
at bureaucratic surrogate behaviour similar to that of (some of the) donors. When that 
happens, local NGOs face similar challenges in solving problems of others. 
Thus despite the rhetoric, cooperating partners in aid projects are not equal, 
first, in the sense that their interests in the project are defined along different 
dimensions. Second, the partners have access to different resources. Third, and 
perhaps more importantly they have different motivations to take on the project. This 
implies multiple ownership of project, discussed in more detail below. Fourth, 
professionalization and bureaucratization can lead to sustainable surrogate behaviour 
on the side of donors and aid recipients. Fifth, in the aid context, cooperation is as a 
rule between parties from different cultural contexts, leading to higher potential for 
misunderstanding but also cross-cultural learning. However, as argued above, without 
commitment these positive fruits of the interactions involved in aid will not be 
harvested. 
With regard to the ownership question, the conclusion must be that only the 
elements of the project that corresponds to the priorities of the receiving organization 
and individuals will be locally owned. This implies that ownership cannot be caused 
but must be selected either as existing priorities or as potential priorities. It also means 
that not all elements that are locally owned are necessarily desirable for the donors’ 
perspective. Thus the selective selection of elements that can be locally owned brings 
in the donor priorities. 
  17 
5.3  The incentives perspective: multiple owners 
Why is ‘local ownership’ perceived as a solution to a problem? After all, when 
an individual organization initiates a project, the question of ownership is more of a 
legal matter in terms of intellectual property rights or an internal matter in terms of 
who or which department drives the project. The ownership issue takes on different 
dimensions when a project is initiated between more than one partner with a stake in 
the project. With clear legal arrangements ownership itself may remain problematic 
with a struggle over the manner in which ownership is distributed over the 
participating organizations or individuals. But this is a fight for more ownership rather 
than an indication of the lack of it. 
Then, what is the problem? Aid projects have a low success rate and are 
plagued by a large number of problems in various phases of the projects. Amongst 
them, sustainability of project results is a major one, when even projects that were 
successfully implemented do not survive the transfer to normal routine, beyond the 
period with the specific project status. The local organization that was ‘helped’ does 
not sustain the project results. Thus, the perceived problem is the less than expected 
rate of success of aid projects. A first line of explanation, namely the lack of 
sustainability effort on the part of a local organization, is often also seen as part of the 
problem. The more fundamental explanation of the difference between private sector 
and aid projects must be found in the specific form of cooperation in the context of 
aid projects, allowing for different ownership relations. 
With aid, parties/roles similar to those in the private sector can be identified in 
defining and implementing projects: the donor/financier, the contractor/technical 
consultant, and the organization for which the project output is intended, be it a local 
NGO, part of government, a semi-autonomous organization, or a private firm. The 
importance of each these roles can vary. Some projects, such as built-operate-transfer 
projects, have only limited involvement of a local organization in the implementation 
phase. In the past, mission projects such as schools, hospitals, urban and rural 
development projects proceeded without local organizations. Presently, a local branch 
will be involved with elements of the local organization and the donor and in 
sometimes complex relationship with the ‘main office’. Typically, in many technical 
assistance projects the three main actors are strongly present: the aid organization, the 
consultant, and the local organization, each with their own interests in the project, 
viewing and defining the project from their own perspective. 
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However, also in the private sector projects exist with a financier, a consultant 
and a (local) organization. But here market mechanisms exist to coordinate the 
activities of the parties towards mutual satisfaction of objectives. In the aid context 
the attention for explaining the differences must therefore shift towards the type of 
incentives and forms of motivation that shape the dynamics of the interaction between 
these parties. In essence, the core of the problem is that parties other than the local 
organization define and control what is best for the local organization. That is the big 
difference between the aid context and the private sector context. Changing the 
incentives system to simulate private market mechanisms does not fundamentally 
alter this difference. 
Additional factors complicate matters. Aid organizations certainly have the 
means in terms of resources and personnel; they also have the intentions (aid-driven 
or otherwise) in terms of their organizational objectives and individual motivation. 
Private sector organizations in both donor and recipient countries have developed to 
accommodate this aid-financed part of the market.  Networks of national and 
international NGOs channel the finance and motivations for ‘helping the other’ 
towards their destinations. In the process of organizational development, 
dependencies grow on either side, making aiding and recipient 
organizations/individuals more self interested and (aid-) market oriented. Projects 
become supply driven, both by the need to have projects as well as by the assumption 
of knowing ‘what is good for them’ (as well as for themselves): an awkward mixture 
of self-interest, paternalism, and genuine ethical concerns, in various degrees and 
combinations expressed and hidden at individual and organizational levels. 
The end-result is that project will have multiple owners, each of whom will 
pull the project into the direction of its own objectives, which often and ironically 
include the perceived objectives of the local organization. This multiplicity is of a 
complex variety involving organizations and individuals in networks of sometimes 
contradicting interests, objectives and intentions embedded in a context where good 
intentions can turn out as bad intentions (as in paternalism) and so-perceived bad 
intentions (in the limited sense of not being aid-driven) can have good consequences 
(where profit making consultants deliver good results). Different value systems 
inform the parties on what is good and bad in terms of goals and priorities, rules of 
behaviour and work attitudes. 
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With this in mind, the following general description of aid becomes plausible: 
aid as a multi-level social, cultural and economic relationship between unequal 
partners involved in a two-directional asymmetric exchange of resources, benefits, 
values and feelings. Success at one level does not necessarily imply or require success 
at a different level. Some persons may be helped, others are not. Some may benefit 
with costs for others.
23
Why is ownership the solution? With multiple ownership identified as the 
problem, the solution of local ownership only reads like a cheap solution.
24 It sounds 
like denying all the complexities of the aid context. Yet, when seriously appreciating 
multiple ownership as a matter of fact, it becomes possible to study the conditions, 
forms and types of aid delivery that would reduce the potential for conflict between 
the objectives of the various parties with regard to the project and/or shift the balance 
of power and ownership towards the local organization. 
To complicate matters further, local ownership is seen not only as a solution to 
a problem but also as an end in itself. However, analyzing ownership as an end in it-
self leads to similar questions about the nature of aid as when ownership is seen as a 
solution to a problem. In other words, these are two aspects or different wordings of 
the same issue. After all what would be the possible reasons why ownership (as an 
end in itself) is not achieved? 
Firstly, are local organizations not capable? Then why did they start their 
projects, on whose initiative, and what are the rival owners? Secondly, are they not 
motivated? In other words are the project priorities not interesting for the organization 
or its individual employees? Then, by whom and why was it started anyway? Are only 
some elements considered useful? Then who is responsible for the design of the other 
elements? This must be a case of mal-aligned interests between parties in the project 
                                                 
23Other definitions or descriptions of aid may be more appropriate to other situations or to highlight 
different aspects. Emphasizing resource transfer (resource view), aid can be seen as the resource given 
by one party to another for achieving the latter’s objectives (food-aid; technical aid; budget support; 
balance of payment support; investment support). Focussing on the whole aid system with all its 
complexities (sector view) aid can be described as is the whole set of organizations, institutions and 
activities, which have developed in and between rich and poor countries, involved in a process of 
transferring resources, values and feelings between unequal partners. Finally, exposing the underlying 
struggle between rich and poor, aid (in the conflict view) can be described as the whole set of 
institutions, which have developed in and between rich and poor countries, involved in a conflict over 
the conditions and modalities of redistributing resources from richer to poorer parties. 
24It resembles converting the problem tree into an objective tree as in the Logical Framework 
Approach. 
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design. Thirdly, are the local organizations not enabled or empowered? Then who 
does the enabling or the empowerment? How is in control? 
It is clear that all the answers to these questions lead into the direction of other 
owners in the projects and with that to the nature of aid relations in projects. Local 
ownership again becomes the solution to a problem caused by the nature of aid 
relations. 
Alternatively, arguing from the view of ownership as a solution, local 
organizations need ownership for project success. But this concerns ownership over 
resources they do not control, used for priorities they did not set. Why forcing this 
type of ownership onto an organization: it is not even their own ownership! Thus, 
addressing the question why this is the case also leads to the nature of aid. The 
conclusion must be that multiple ownership is typical for aid projects from whatever 
perspective one assumes.  
While ownership of an aid project as a whole always involves multiple 
ownership, further analysis in section 0 has shown that it is necessary to discuss 
ownership at the level of project elements (inputs, activities, outputs) and phases (e.g. 
identification, implementation, completion, evaluation). Multiple ownership of project 
elements and phases stretches along a continuum of co-ownership to ownership of 
project elements dominated or even exclusively owned by one party (as some of the 
donor conditions are). 
 
5.4 Rational  expectations  perspective: aid as trade 
The rational expectations perspective, one of the pillars of neoclassical 
economy, would argue that aid is the result of optimizing individual and social utility. 
The rational expectation assumption comes in two forms: a meaningful form and a 
tautological form. The tautological form poses that ex post behaviour can be 
explained as if decisions guiding the behaviour were guided by rational utility 
maximization. Of course, this has to be true, because an outcome has been realized as 
the result of whatever causes. If by definition (however hard the practical 
specification might be) all these causes are included in a utility function the tautology 
becomes obvious: a theory it must necessarily be correct if all causes are included. 
The more meaningful and therefore more debatable form of rational expectations is 
formulated by restricting the explanation to certain causes, which in economics are 
then often reduced to identifiable, quantifiable and value-able causes. This economist 
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reduction is not necessary for the present purpose, since immaterial benefits can also 
enter the calculations of utility maximizers in a less quantified application of rational 
expectations. 
In this perspective then, aid is given for a return. Aid is trade and exchange. 
The benefits of aid providers range relate to political influence and strategic 
advantages; economic concessions; national and global environmental concerns; 
organizational survival, particular interest groups such as children and women rights, 
religion and churches, and animal rights, and moral satisfaction and ethical 
motivation. In return for these benefits, the poor (and less poor) countries, including 
their organizations and individuals, receive aid. Different levels and segments in the 
aid sector will obtain different combinations of benefits. For example, many aid 
providing organizations will not be motivated by strategic and political concerns, 
whereas foreign ministries and their development aid departments usually do. Various 
aid agendas, also of lower level aid organizations are influenced by higher level 
strategic use of ‘generally good’ principles such as good governance, human rights, 
irrespective of their intrinsic value. 
From the same point of view, aid receiving organizations will use their 
positions to obtain the best deal for their problems: cost effective provision of goods 
and services; access to markets; individual benefits such as training, travel and related 
income. Often, having a project status enhances the standing of a department in an 
organization just as organizations with important aid projects gain status in the overall 
public system. This can result in more power and resources for the organizations 
involved. 
Thus, in this perspective, ownership of personal and organizational benefits is 
important. This is a concern for ownership over outputs rather than processes. And 
where ownership and control of processes gain importance, this will be explained in 
terms of their influence over obtaining the final benefits. Tokens of ownership and 
partnership, when they are a concern of aid providers, can be provided and traded for 
ownership of benefits. As long as the benefits are there, the ownership and partnership 
rituals will be played as was discussed under surrogate behaviour. 
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5.5 Competing  perspectives? 
The reality of aid practice does not fit exclusively in one of the above 
categories and mixed modes of understanding must prevail. In the sense of their 
descriptive power these perspectives are not competitive but complementary. 
As a summary, the table below shows the relation between perspective, main 
concept, theoretical field, and aspects of ownership. 
TABEL 1 
Aid perspective, main concept, theoretical background and relation to ownership 
Perspective  Concept  Field of theory  Ownership outcome 
Aid as commitment  Inter-
subjectivity 
Feminist sociology and 
psychology 
Genuine ownership but seldom 
achieved 
Aid as trade  Exchange  Neoclassical economics  Partial ownership of outputs; 
other aspects irrelevant or 
coincidental 





Aid as outcome  Incentives  Institutional economics  Multiple ownership 
 
For instance, the realization of the other organization as a subject with its own 
potential for interaction constitutes limits to a view of the world with only objects in 
its field of observation. Negatively, it may lead to attempts to control the other 
organization so as to recreate the false safety of a world with objects only. Positively, 
this realization permits communicative activities and creating joint ownership. It also 
requires a common ground of trust. Within the unequal world of aid this is not a 
natural outcome. Two parties are required for creating an inter-subjective reality. The 
notions of partnership and ownership belong to this domain; partnership because it is 
defined as a relation; ownership because it must be given, stimulated and accepted in 
an unequal setting, implying mutual trust. Only under these conditions can the ethical 
paradox be solved. Without it, the bureaucratic perspective takes over leading to 
surrogate behaviour. 
The unequal aid relation will also affect the processes of internalization and 
externalization discussed in Section 3. Normally, the internalization process in the 
intrapsychic and externalization of the other in the intersubjective are in balance. 
However when two persons interact in an unequal relation the balance in each of these 
persons may shift in opposite directions. The resource-rich person will emphasize 
externalization processes attempting to create intersubjectivity while the resource-
scarce person will shift to objectivation in the intrapsychic. Similarly, the aid 
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receiving organization will be more involved with internalization processes while the 
aid provider and consultant more with externalization. Thus where one party looks for 
partnerships and local ownership, the other will attempt to establish psychological 
independence and autonomy by calling on the ‘aid as trade’ perspective and by 
looking for personal and organizational benefits not necessarily within the confines of 
agreed project intentions and objectives. 
Multiple ownership in a quasi-market environment calls upon elements of 
rational expectations and related neoclassical economic perspectives. Yet the aid 
market is essentially a quasi-market. Multiple ownership can only evolve into co-
ownership when trust is created by establishing a positively interpreted inter-
organizational reality. Yet, even with good intentions based on underlying value 
systems on the side of the aid provider with regard to establishing, or expanding the 
role of, local ownership (a tour de force governed by contradictions of inequality and 
one-sidedness), it remains an elusive ideal when the other parties (consultant and aid 
receiver) are not committed to develop a sense of co-ownership (including the 
accompanying experience of trust and inter-subjectivity), given the reality of multiple 
ownership. Thus the rational expectations perspective has to be complemented with 
the ethical view. 
Finally, in actual aid practice and related normative discourse, the perspectives 
can be rather conflicting. Yet amongst these normative views, the view taken in this 
paper is that a judicious and selective use of aid as commitment, as trade and as 
outcome might lead to an environment where local ownership can survive (rather than 
develop). This carries the risk of the worst-of-all scenario when the professional and 
bureaucratic modes lead to the derailment of commitment and aid ethics and all 
positive aid intentions dissipate in surrogate behaviour leading to obscure results in 
terms of who-gets-what from aid. 
Together, these are arguments in favour of true commitment and true interests: 
a ‘happy’, albeit ‘uneasy’ and ‘precarious’, combination of the market perspective 
with the commitment perspective, guided by the pragmatic views of the incentives 
paradigm of institutional economics. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reviewed different perspectives on aid and local ownership: aid 
as commitment, aid as profession, aid as outcome and aid as trade. In practice all of 
these assert their influence in various combinations in different aid forms and 
individually, in different circumstances and at different moments in time. 
Aid itself is an expression of inequality, implying that the attitudes towards 
ownership in aid relation are not identical between the aid provider and the aid 
receiver. Statements about partnerships and co-ownership must be qualified with 
reference to this inequality. Without this, the otherwise ethical considerations will 
remain in the realm of wishful thinking, perhaps fulfilling a psychological 
requirement to soothing the impact of the aid paradox. 
The position this paper has taken is that an eclectic approach to practicing aid 
must be taken. To counterbalance the embedded inequality in the aid relation, aid 
(from the side of local or international aid providers), should be practiced as an ethical 
relation, including elements of planning, pragmatic considerations and commitment. 
From the side of the aid receiver, an ethical use of aid as entitlement might reduce the 
dependency aspect of aid. 
The organizational form of the aid agency and the consultant should 
emphasize higher order learning processes found in more innovative organizations 
rather than relying in routine management typical for bureaucracies. A typical 
outcome of aid as profession is the bureaucratization of aid processes leading to 
sustained surrogate behaviour vis-à-vis issues on both sides although for different 
reasons. 
Interactions between professionals in the role of consultants and professionals 
in local organizations tend to focussed more easily on commitment to quality in the 
transfer of knowledge and skills. A common professional language facilitates 
communication across cultures. 
Projects relating to core priorities of the local organization are more likely to 
select existing ownership than projects lower on the priority list. These will reflect 
issues and concerns that the local organization already owns, even when the 
organization is still in an early stage of development. Trying to add donor priorities to 
the list of owned objectives will prove counter-effective not only for the particular 
objective itself but even for co-ownership of other objectives. Thus, if the aid 
providers are serious about ownership their assistance should not pursue their own 
  25 
priorities when these are not shard with the aid receiving organization. Such priorities 
will not be sustainable independently from continued donor insistence, leaving them 
without local ownership.
25
At the more theoretical level, the paper has argued that the shift towards self 
assertion (internalization in the unequal aid relationship) leads to objectivation of the 
aid provider and the appropriation of resources. This could be argued to be precisely 
the intended outcome. Yet the appropriation of resources may be ownership alright, 
but not necessarily as intended. When, in addition, at side of the aid provider 
additional demands are made, donor inspired conditions are set and bureaucratic 
tendencies prevail, little will be left over from a shared intersubjectivity. Thus the 
intended empowerment through local ownership takes an unexpected turn away from 
partnership, towards objectivation of aid itself as a resource available for the aid 
receiver. This would be a strong argument not to set donor conditions according to 
donor priorities, to avoid bureaucratization, and to emphasize commitment when 
trying to establish local ownership in an atmosphere of partnership, without however 
guaranteed outcomes. 
The emphasis on commitment and limitation of project choice to areas of 
competence of aid provider, consultant and local organization requires honesty about 
motivation and the limitation of one’s competences. In this sense, project planning 
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